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Abstract
We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian
or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources
from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and
low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader
spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation.
We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income
inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is
relatively high. We also obtain that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled
more often by center-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian
constitutions. The implications for the relationship between inequality and redistribution
are discussed. Historical evidence and a cross-sectional analysis support our results.
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In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the political economics literature
for the role of key constitutional norms in shaping scal policy outcomes. Important theo-
retical contributions include, among others, Myerson (1993), Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(1997, 2000), Persson and Tabellini (2000), Austen-Smith (2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2001)
and Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) and generally predict that proportional
electoral systems and parliamentary regimes should be associated with more provision of
public goods and universalistic welfare programs, as well as with larger size of governments.
These results have been conrmed by some recent empirical works. Persson and Tabellini
(2003, 2004) present cross-country evidence suggesting that a switch from proportional to
majoritarian elections reduces total government spending by almost 5% of GDP and welfare
spending by 2-3% of GDP, and obtain similar results for a switch from a parliamentary to a
presidential regime. Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002), Lijphart (1999) and other
works provide empirical evidence going in the same direction.
These contributions are based on the premise of taking political institutions as given.
But if di¤erent constitutional provisions lead to di¤erent scal policies, and therefore gen-
erate di¤erent benets for the various groups in the society, we should expect individuals
having di¤erent preferences over constitutions and taking this into account at the time of the
constitutional choice. In this paper, we start from the consideration that the various groups
in the society may have conicting interests over constitutions, and provide an economic
theory of the choice of a democratic constitution on the base of the (pre-tax) distribution
of income within a society.1 In other words, we recognize that constitutions are endogenous
and their choice a¤ected by economic fundamentals.
Whereas constitutional models di¤er along several dimensions, in our analysis we focus on
the electoral system as this is generally considered one of the most important constitutional
provisions, at least from a scal policy outcome perspective. As pointed out by Lijphart
(1999), in parliamentary regimes, the electoral system leads to two distinctive types of de-
mocratic models. One is the majoritarian model characterized by a majoritarian (plurality
rule or rst-past-the-post) electoral system that generally leads to the formation of a two
party system and to the concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister. The
1The focus on the distribution of income is motivated by the insights provided by the positive political
economics theory of taxation and redistribution in democracies (e.g. Romer, 1975, Roberts, 1977, Meltzer
and Richard, 1981), which stresses the importance of this variable in shaping scal policy outcomes when
individual preferences are aggregated directly by majority voting. The class conict perspective over dif-
ferent institutional frameworks and the key role played by income inequality have been rst emphasized by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) in their analysis about democratic transitions.
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other is the consensual (or proportional) model which is characterized by a proportional elec-
toral rule leading to a multi-party system and, therefore, to coalition governments.2 While
our theoretical model represents precisely these two types of parliamentary regimes, at some
point we argue that our model of majoritarian democracy may also describe well presidential
regimes where the president has relatively large legislative powers.
Our main result is that a majoritarian constitution is more likely to be chosen when the
degree of income inequality is relatively high, while consensual democracy is more likely to
arise in relatively homogeneous societies.
We present a simple public nance model where scal policy is about the provision of some
public goods, nanced with proportional taxation of income. The public goods considered
are local, or group-specic, in the sense that each of them is desired by one and only one of the
three social groups (or classes) which compose the society and that are identied by their
level of pre-tax income: the poor, the middle class and the rich. We go on by characterizing
the political equilibrium of the model in a majoritarian and in a consensual democracy
respectively. A key assumption that we maintain in each constitutional environment is that
politicians are citizen-candidates who have a direct interest in the policy implemented and
cannot credibly commit to implement any policy di¤erent from their preferred one.
We assume that scal policy in a majoritarian democracy is decided by a leaderelected
directly by the people through a majority voting process. We demonstrate that in equilibrium
the winner is always a rich citizen-candidate as the rich enjoy a natural advantage over the
other two classes, arising from the interaction of their relative scal conservatism and the
majoritarian electoral law, and conclude that the structure of majoritarian democracy biases
policy outcomes in favour of this group.
In a consensual democracy scal policy is decided by a coalition government formed
as the outcome of some legislative bargaining process among the members of a parliament
elected with a proportional electoral law. We show that the government coalition depends
on the distribution of income. According to our model, in a consensual democracy a middle
class and rich (middle class and poor), or center-right (center-left), government coalition is
more likely to be formed when the distribution of income is more (less) polarized. We also
2It is worth emphasizing that the features of the majoritarian model, typically represented by the U.K.,
also lead to a dominance of the executive over the legislative power, while in consensual democracies, widely
observed in continental Europe, the distribution of power between the executive and the legislative power is
more balanced.
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show that taxation and the size of government in a consensual democracy under a center-left
coalition are higher than under a center-right one, and that they are generally higher in a
consensual than in a majoritarian democracy.
Finally, we evaluate from the point of view of the di¤erent groups of citizens the welfare
implications of the two types of political institutions, and we let individuals vote in an
original position in the absence of any veil of ignorance on which constitution to adopt.
We nd that a society with high income inequality prefers a majoritarian constitution while
consensual democracy is preferred when inequality is lower. The intuition behind this result
is simple. The rich prefer the majoritarian system because they always get to power. The
middle class prefer the consensual model as it is always part of the government coalition.
Hence, the poor are the swing voters. When inequality is low, they end up being part of the
government in consensual democracy, and will therefore prefer this political system. When
inequality is high, the poor are not part of the government in the consensual system and then
prefer the majoritarian one. They do not get their specic public good in any case but the
rich under majoritarian democracy tax them less than the middle class and rich coalition.
The main prediction of our paper that more unequal societies are expected to choose
a majoritarian constitution while more equal countries opt for a consensual one is tested
with a cross-sectional analysis in a sample of 57 democracies and in a sub-sample of 31
parliamentary democracies. To avoid problems of endogeneity, we use the income inequality
at the time of (or before) the adoption of the constitution and nd that, as predicted by our
theory, the degree of inequality is a highly signicant determinant of constitutional choice.
The model has also other important implications concerning the politico-economic out-
comes in representative democracies. In accordance with the existing literature, we obtain
that taxation and the size of government in consensual democracies are higher than in ma-
joritarian ones. However, the mechanism generating this result in our model is new and due
to a selection bias in the composition of the government coalition. Consensual democracies
should be expected to be ruled relatively often by center-left coalitions, more willing to tax
and redistribute income, while the more scally conservative right should have an advantage
in majoritarian countries. We also emphasize that our constitution selection theory may
shed some light on the relationship between inequality and redistribution, suggesting that
the former not only a¤ects scal policy for a given constitution, but it also inuences the
choice of the constitution itself. As a result, the relationship between income inequality and
3
redistribution may well be absent or negative as suggested by the empirical evidence (e.g.
Perotti, 1996) and contrary to the results obtained by models based on the median voter.3
As explained above, our theory also provides a clear prediction about the preferences of
the social groups for the type of constitution. We present some historical evidence that is
in accordance with our ndings. In particular, we present evidence that the constitution of
the U.S. has been drafted to reect essentially the interests of the economic elite of the time,
and something similar happened in other majoritarian democracies as the U.K. and Chile.
We also discuss the adoption of consensual constitutions by several continental European
countries and argue that, in accordance with our theory, in most cases this choice was made
by center-left forces in a period of low and/or declining income inequality.
Although this paper contains various interesting results, its main contribution to the
literature is to provide a theory of constitutional choice highlighting the endogeneity of
political institutions and the role played by economic fundamentals in this choice. Such
fundamentals, in our case income inequality, are themselves a¤ected by the constitutional
rules through their e¤ect on scal policy outcomes. By clarifying the endogeneity and the
factors behind the choice of a constitution, our theory may o¤er guidelines for future empirical
research to the literature on the economic consequences of constitutions. Our paper is also
related to the recent literature about the choice of voting rules (e.g. Aghion and Bolton,
2003, Barbera and Jackson, 2004, Messner and Polborn, 2004) and other political institutions
(e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi, 2004).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the basic economic setting and
the public nance problem we focus on. Sections 2 and 3 present the political equilibrium
of the model in majoritarian and consensual democracy respectively. Section 4 characterizes
the properties of the political equilibrium within and across constitutions. Section 5 deals
with the key issue of the endogeneity of the constitution and its relation with the distribu-
tion of income. In Section 6 we discuss the intermediate results of our theory and present
evidence supporting them. Section 7 shows the results of our cross-sectional analysis on the
relationship between income inequality and constitutional choice. Section 8 concludes.
3Our theory implies that more unequal countries are expected to choose a majoritarian model where
redistribution is low, while more unequal societies are expected to adopt consensual constitutions that lead
to more redistributive outcomes.
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1 A Simple Model of Public Finance: Basic Setup
We consider a simple model of local(that is, group specic) public goods provision based
on Persson and Tabellini (2000 ch. 7). A society is made up by N > 1 groups of individuals.
For convenience, we focus on the case where N = 3. Group j 2 =  fp; b; rg has size
(measure) mj and each individual of that group has an exogenous pre-tax income equal to
yj. Total population is made by a continuum of unitary measure
P
j2=m
j = 1 and with no
loss of generality we assume that maxfmp;mrg < mb < 1=2 and that yp < yb < yr. This
means that group b is the largest one and has an intermediate level of income, so that it is
natural to identify it with the middle class.Group p and group r correspond vice-versa
to the poorand to the richpeople. The absolute majority of votes is reached by the
combination of any pair of groups. Notice also that the above assumptions are su¢ cient to
ensure that the voter with median income (i.e. the median voter if preferences are single-
crossing in income) belongs to group b. Finally, we assume that yb < y  Pj2=mjyj: the
voter with median income is poorer then the (virtual) mean voter, which means that the
distribution of income is skewed to the left consistently with the empirical evidence.
We assume that the utility function of each member of group j has the following quasi-
linear form
(1) wj = cj +H(gj)
where cj denotes the consumption of a private good and gj the level of the type j public
good provided. H () is a smooth, increasing and concave function and satises the Inada
conditions.4 We also assume that H (0) = 0. The Inada conditions guarantee that at the
optimum each group will always strictly prefer to have some taxation and some provision of
its desired public good to the alternative of no taxation and no public good. All the above
properties are satised by the constant elasticity functional form H(gj) = A(gj), where A is
a constant and  2 (0; 1). At some point we will use such preference specication to obtain
some analytical and numerical results.
Each group is perfectly homogeneous. Heterogeneity is only between groups and is related
to the di¤erences in the pre-tax income level and to group-specic preferences on the public
good to be provided. The specication of preferences in equation (1) implies that each
group values one particular public good only and there are as many kinds of public goods
4This means that Hg () > 0, Hgg () < 0 and limgj!0Hg(gj) =1.
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as the groups of people. The local public goods can be interpreted as publicly provided
private goods, like education, health and housing, on which di¤erent income groups have
di¤erent preferences.5 However, the important implication of our specication of individual
preferences is that redistribution can be targeted toward specic social groups.6
Income is taxed at a proportional rate  2 [0; 1] that will be determined later as a part
of the political equilibrium of the model. Therefore, the budget constraint of the agents of
group j is simply cj = (1  ) yj. We also assume that the government can nance public
expenditures only out of the revenues generated by income taxation. In equilibrium, gj is
positive only when group j is part of the government. If we incorporate this result in the
public sector budget constraint, the latter can be rewritten as
P
j2
 g
j 6 
P
j2=m
jyj = y,
where 
  fj 2 = : j is part of the governmentg.
As will become clear later, the quasi-linearity of preferences and the assumption of no tax
discrimination simplify the analysis. Our results generalize as long as higher income levels
translate into a preference for lower tax rates and groups in power cannot raise tax rates
on other groups only. Our results would no longer go through if the group in power could
impose a tax rate on other groups that is independent of the one that applies to itself (in
this case the group in power could fully expropriate any other groups).
In the next two sections, we derive and characterize the political equilibrium of our
model, namely the tax rate  , the overall level of public expenditure and its composition
G  (gp; gb; gr), in the case of both a majoritarian constitution and a consensual one. Since
the constitution is at this stage still taken as given, these equilibria can be considered as
partial political equilibria. Then, we characterize the general political equilibrium where the
constitution will be itself endogenous and chosen by the society.
We assume that voting is sincere in any constitutional environment and model the po-
litical process going on within a majoritarian or a consensual democracy drawing on the
5See for example Besley and Coate (1991) who show that, allowing for di¤erent quality levels of the public
goods, a de jure universal provision scheme does not imply that it is de facto universal and explain why
some publicly provided private goods like health care may go to the advantage of the poor and not to the
rich. Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) also discuss the case of higher education and emphasize how the public
provision of it can benet higher-income individuals at the expense of the poor.
6It can be shown that the main results of the paper are robust to a more general specication of individual
preferences and of the menu of the scal policy instruments available. If, for example, the members of a
social group obtain some utility also from the provision of the other public goods, or there is a general public
good providing utility to all individuals, the main results of the paper would still hold as long as the taste
for the group-specic public good is strong enough (see for further details Ticchi and Vindigni, 2003).
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citizen-candidate apparatus of Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997).7
We adopt a model of endogenous political candidacy since we want to emphasize the link
existing between individual preferences (of citizens as well as of politicians) and individ-
ual income. Moreover, a key advantage of this model is to allow for the existence of an
equilibrium even when individual preferences fail to be single-peaked.8
2 Majoritarian Democracy
We assume that in a majoritarian democracy scal policy is decided by a leaderelected di-
rectly by the people through a majority voting process among the menu of citizen-candidates
participating to the election. With this assumption, we mean to capture the winner-takes-
all nature of political competition going on within a majoritarian democracy. Thus, the
model represents both a parliamentary democracy where the legislature is elected with a
majoritarian electoral rule (e.g. the U.K.), a presidential regime with a legislative assembly
elected with a majoritarian electoral law (e.g. the U.S.), and a presidential regime where the
president plays a very important role in the legislative process (which is typically the case
in Latin America).9
The menu of candidates is endogenous and one individual runs for o¢ ce if and only if, in
equilibrium, the net gain of doing so (the di¤erence between the utility he gets if does-does
not run) exceeds the exogenous cost of running. The winner of the election is the candidate
gaining the plurality of votes and he alone decides on scal policy.
To characterize the political equilibrium under a majoritarian constitution, it is useful
to start from the benchmark case of the unconstrained preferred policy of each social group.
Then, suppose that a member of group j (which one is irrelevant given the assumption of
7Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) assume sincere voting while in Besley and Coate (1997) individuals are
strategic. In this sense our model is closer to the rst one.
8This is a potentially serious problem in our model since the policy space is multidimensional, and thus
voting cycles may occur. The citizen-candidate model allows us to avoid the problem of non-existence of
an equilibrium. At the same time, we are able to show that the main drawback of it, namely the generic
multiplicity of political equilibria, is not an issue in our economy.
9Our theory suggests that because in the U.S. both the legislature and the president are elected with the
same electoral law, their preferences over scal policy should be relatively similar, and divided government
(e.g. Alesina and Rosenthal, 1994) should not be of central importance in this respect. Also, in an extension of
our model (available from the authors), we show that essentially the same political equilibrium carries over in
an institutional environment where, as in Latin America, the president has relatively large legislative powers
(including setting the agenda and vetoing bills) and the assembly is elected with proportional representation
(PR). We therefore conclude that scal policy outcomes in presidential regimes with PR depend primarily
on the nature of the electoral law of the president.
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perfect within group homogeneity) could act as a dictator and implement his preferred policy
(dictatorial policy). It is clear that he would not spend anything in any public good other
than his preferred one, so that gi = 0, i 6= j and gj = y. Hence, he would maximize the
following utility wj = (1  ) yj+H (y). The (unique) optimal dictatorial tax rate of group
j that solves this problem is10
(2)  j =
H 1g (y
j=y)
y
:
It is straightforward to verify that @ j=@yj < 0. The richer is a group j member (for a
given mean level of income), the higher is the marginal cost of public good provision he faces
and the lower is his demand for his preferred public good. Hence, the dictatorial tax rates
for the three groups can be ordered as:  r <  b <  p.
No commitment technology is assumed to be available, and therefore candidates cannot
announce credibly before the election to pursue, if elected, any policy di¤erent from their
preferred one. Let k denote some private benet of being in o¢ ce, which is either a psy-
chological benet or a non-taxed monetary income, and " be the cost of running. Both are
exogenous and equal for everybody with k > ". Now, we can state the main result of this
section.
Proposition 1. The model has a unique political equilibrium with the following features.
Only rich citizen-candidates run for o¢ ce, only the public good preferred by the rich is
provided and the dictatorial tax rate of the rich  r is implemented.
Proof. See Appendix.
There are four elements of the model that are important for the results of this proposition.
First, no one group has the majority of the votes alone. Second, the utility function is chosen
in such a way that the rich, as dictator, is the group that prefers the lowest taxes. Third,
the winner-takes-all nature of the electoral process: in two-candidate contests between the
rich and another group, the rich always win since they prefer less taxation.11 Fourth, if a
group expects to lose an election, no candidate is forthcoming.
10It is immediate to verify that the second order condition is satised. The Inada conditions imposed on
H() imply that the tax rate is always strictly positive.
11This implies that, o¤-equilibrium, it is possible to observe an extreme coalitionmade up by the rich
and the poor. As it is clear from the proof of Proposition 1, in case there is a rich and a middle class
candidate, the poor prefer to vote for the rich since the latters scal conservatism is the best alternative
they have.
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3 Consensual Democracy
In a consensual democracy voters do not elect a leader directly but rather elect their rep-
resentatives to the parliament. We assume the existence of a parliament composed by a
continuum of measure  2 (0; 1) of members which are elected with a pure proportional
electoral rule in a single nation-wide electoral district. The government is formed as the out-
come of a process of legislative bargaining among the representatives of the di¤erent groups
and it expresses a certain parliamentary majority.12 We also assume that the plurality of
parliamentary votes is su¢ cient to form a government.
The policy formation process corresponds to the following three-stages game: 1) the entry
of candidates stage; 2) the voting stage; 3) the legislative bargaining stage.
Assuming that there are three groups in the parliament and that no group has the
absolute majority of parliamentary members (which will be the case in equilibrium), events
take place at the legislative bargaining stage according to the following protocol.
 Round 1 of the bargaining game: the head of the representatives (appointed at random)
of the group having the relative majority of seats in the parliament is called to make a
policy proposal to the head of the representatives of another group of his choice. Given
that buyingvotes is costly, only two groups coalitions will be observed and a version
of Rikers minimum size coalition principle will apply.
 If the proposal is accepted, the government coalition is formed and the agreed policy
is implemented.
 Round 2 of the bargaining game: if the proposal is not approved, a second agenda
setter is appointed randomly by nature between the representatives of the two groups
of which no member was agenda setter at round 1. More precisely, a member of either
of these groups is appointed as agenda setter at round 2 with probability equal to the
share of the parliamentary seats of his group, relative to the total number of seats of the
two groups. Then, the second agenda setter has the opportunity to form a government
and formulates a coalition proposal to another group of his choice.
12In modelling the legislative bargaining process taking place in a consensual democracy, we partly draw
on the agenda-setting model of Romer and Rosenthal (1979), as well as on the model of legislative decision
making in a three-party proportional representation system o¤ered by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988).
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 If no proposal is approved at round 2, the game ends and the status quo policy is
implemented. We assume that the status quo policy corresponds to no taxation and
no public goods provision.
Notice that our modelling of the policy making process in a consensual democracy is
innovative in at least two dimensions. First, we study a legislative bargaining process between
citizen-candidates representatives. Second, we analyze how the distribution of income shapes
scal policy outcomes through the non-standard channel of the bargaining power of the
di¤erent classes, which is endogenous and turns out to depend on the income distribution
itself.
3.1 Entry of Candidates, Voting and Bargaining
The equilibrium of the policy formation game must be sequentially rational, which means
that the Nash equilibrium at each stage of the game must rationally anticipate its subsequent
equilibrium path.
The assumption of sincere voting and the citizen-candidate structure imply that each
individual will simply vote for a candidate from his own social group. This fact and the
proportionality of the electoral law imply that group j elects a total of mj representatives.13
That is, the parliament is a mirror-image of society in the sense that the distribution of seats
across the three groups exactly reects the distribution of the population across these groups.
The agenda setter at round 1 is a representative of the middle-class, which (being the
largest class) has the largest number of seats in the parliament. Moreover, if the middle class
fails to form a government, the second agenda setter is appointed randomly by nature and
chosen between the representatives of the poor and the rich. By assumption, the probability
that a poor (rich) will be the agenda setter at the second round (conditional of the game
reaching it) is equal to the share of the seats of the poor (rich) of the combined number of
seats of the poor and of the rich. Hence,
 =
mp
mp +mr
13It is straightforward to verify that the supply of candidates from each group is not lower than mj . Since
the parliament is large, the policy outcome does not depend on whether any individual does or does not
run for o¢ ce. Therefore, a citizen-candidate of group j runs for o¢ ce if and only if pk > ", where p is the
probability of being elected, pinned down at p = "=k 2 (0; 1] by the assumption of free entry of candidates.
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is the probability that a poor is appointed as agenda setter at round 2.
It is clear that  can be interpreted as an index of the bargaining power of the poor: the
higher is the number of the poor mp, the higher is , the higher is the probability that the
poor are agenda setter at the second round, the higher is their expected utility at that stage
of the game, and therefore the higher will be the public good that the middle class agenda
setter (at round 1) provides them for any given level of taxation so to accept her government
coalition proposal. Moreover, as we will show later,  is also a measure of income inequality:
other things equal, a higher  corresponds to a more unequal income distribution.14
The legislative bargaining game has a unique (subgame-perfect) Nash equilibrium. The
rst agenda setter (from the middle class) formulates a coalition formation proposal based
on a scal policy program to another group only, given that no more than that is needed
to reach a parliamentary majority. The coalition formation o¤er leaves the group receiving
it indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting it and the o¤er is accepted. Therefore, the
question we need to answer is: which group (among the poor and the rich) is the cheapest
to buy? To answer this question, we rst solve our bargaining game by backward induction
starting from the second round.
We denote the group of the agenda setter with h, the other group part of the government
with l and the stage of the game with s. Therefore,  s;h;l is the tax rate proposed to group
l by the agenda setter h at round s of the game. The correspondent level of public good
received by the group i will be gis;h;l. Similarly, the level of utility of the group i is w
i
s;h;l.
3.1.1 Round 2 of the Bargaining Game
Lemma 1. At round 2 of the bargaining game, the poor are always part of the government
coalition; the middle class is so only if the agenda setter is a poor and the rich only if the
agenda setter is a rich.
Proof. At round 2, the outside option of each group is its status quo utility, i.e. its gross
income. Since the agenda setter optimizes giving to the coalition partner what is strictly
necessary to induce it to accept the policy proposed, the policy menu ( 2;h;l; gls;h;l) o¤ered
from the agenda setter h to group l satises the condition (1   2;h;l) yl + H(gl2;h;l) = yl.
14Finally notice that the probability  2 (0; 1) because mp and mr are always positive. However, in the
analysis presented below we also consider the limit cases where  = 0 and  = 1 because they allows us to
dene the tax rates and utilities in the closed interval [0; 1].
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Consider the schedule gl2;h;l  gl2;h;l( 2;h;l; yl) dened implicitly by this equation. Holding
constant  2;h;l, this schedule is such that @gl2;h;l=@y
l =  2;h;l=Hg(g
l
2;h;l) > 0. This means that
the richer is a group, the more it has to be compensated in terms of public good provision
for any level of taxation. Thus, if the rich is appointed agenda setter at the second round,
he will always prefer the poor to the middle class as coalition partner. Alternatively, if the
second round agenda setter is poor, the middle class will be cheaper to buy than the rich.
The legislative bargaining protocol implies that the middle class is never agenda setter at
round 2.
Therefore, if at round 2 the agenda setter is a rich, then by Lemma 1 the poor will be
the coalition partner. The substitution of the equilibrium government budget constraint
( 2;r;py = g
p
2;r;p + g
r
2;r;p) in the utility function of the rich implies that their maximization
problem is
(3) max
f2;r;pg
wr2;r;p = (1   2;r;p) yr +H( 2;r;py   gp2;r;p)
subject to the participation constrain of the poor (1   2;r;p) yp+H(gp2;r;p) = yp. If at round 2
the agenda setter is a poor, he makes a coalition with the middle class and the maximization
problem is derived in a similar way.
3.1.2 Round 1 of the Bargaining Game
While the poor are always part of the government coalition if the game reaches round 2 (an
o¤-equilibrium event), this does not need be the case at round 1. At this stage of the game,
the middle class agenda setter will form the government coalition with the group that allows
her to reach the highest level of utility from the implemented policy. This policy will be
such to leave the group receiving the o¤er just indi¤erent between accepting it and going
to the second round. As we will see, the expected utility of each group at round 2 depends
positively on its probability of being agenda setter at that stage. Hence, the higher is the
probability  of the poor of being agenda setter at round 2, the higher is their expected
utility at this stage of the game, the more costly is for the middle class to buy their vote
at round 1, and therefore the less likely is that they are part of the government coalition.
In what follows, we will establish a global result which identies the winning coalition in
terms of a critical value of . To proceed in this direction, we rst dene the maximization
problems of the middle class under the two possible coalitions.
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If the government coalition is made up by the middle class and the rich, the participation
constraint of the rich at round 1 is
(4) (1   1;b;r) yr +H(gr1;b;r) > (1  )

(1   2;r;p) yr +H(gr2;r;p)

+  (1   2;p;b) yr:
The left hand side of (4) represents the utility of the rich if the middle classpolicy proposal
at round 1 is implemented, while the right hand side is their expected utility conditional on
the game reaching round 2.
Substituting the equilibrium government budget constraint (
1;b;r
y = gb
1;b;r
+ gr
1;b;r
) in the
utility function of the middle class, their maximization problem becomes
(5) max
f1;b;rg
wb
1;b;r
= (1  
1;b;r
)yb +H(
1;b;r
y   gr
1;b;r
)
subject to the participation constraint of the rich (4). This constraint may not be always
binding however. This is the case when the dictatorial policy of the middle class gives to the
rich a higher utility than their expected utility at round 2. In this situation the consensual
democracy equilibrium is equivalent to the dictatorship of the middle class which obtains
the maximum level of utility by implementing her unconstrained preferred policy.15 When
the participation constraint of the rich is binding, the rst order condition relative to the
maximization problem (5) is
(6) yb = Hg( 1;b;ry   gr1;b;r)
"
y   y
r
Hg(gr1;b;r)
#
and this equation allows us to get 
1;b;r
and gr
1;b;r
if combined with equation (4). Then, gb1;b;r
is obtained from the government budget constraint.
If the coalition government is made up by the middle class and the poor, the participation
constraint of the poor at round 1 is
(7) (1   1;b;p) yp +H(gp1;b;p) > (1  ) yp + 

(1   2;p;b) yp +H(gp2;p;b)

:
15From an inspection of (4), it is immediate to verify that this is always the case whenever, as  approaches
one, the middle class dictatorial tax rate  b is lower than 2;p;b. For example, it is easy to prove analytically
that  b < 2;p;b at  = 1 if yp = 0. Indeed, under these conditions 2;p;b is dened by the equation
yb=Hg(2;p;by
b) = y and the dictatorial tax rate of the middle class by yb=Hg( by) = y, which imply that
2;p;by
b =  by. From yb < y follows that  b < 2;p;b. Our numerical simulations, that we discuss in the next
section, show that this result also holds for values of  di¤erent from one or when the income of the poor
is positive. Clearly, the lower is the income of the poor and the higher is 2;p;b, which in turn makes more
likely that the participation constraint of the rich is not binding.
13
The left hand side of (7) is the utility of the poor at round 1 if the middle classpolicy
proposal is implemented, while the right hand side corresponds to their expected utility
if the game reaches the second round. This participation constraint is always binding (if
yp > 0), and therefore hold with the equality sign, because the expected utility of the poor
at round 2 is at least equal to their level of income (i.e. what they get if the status quo policy
is implemented) given that they are always part of the government coalition at this stage.
The substitution of the equilibrium government budget constraint (
1;b;p
y = gb
1;b;p
+ gp
1;b;p
)
in the utility function of the middle class implies that their maximization problem can be
written as
(8) max
f1;b;pg
wb
1;b;p
=
 
1  
1;b;p

yb +H( 1;b;py   gp1;b;p)
subject to the participation constraint of the poor (7). The rst order condition of this
problem reads
(9) yb = Hg( 1;b;py   gp1;b;p)
24y   yp
Hg

gp
1;b;p

35 :
From (9) and (7) we obtain  1;b;p and gp1;b;p , while g
b
1;b;p
is derived from the government budget
constraint.
The next Proposition characterizes the outcome of the coalition formation process at the
rst round of the legislative bargaining game.
Proposition 2. There exists a threshold value of ,  2 (0; 1) such that
(i) if  < , the government coalition is made by the middle class and by the poor;
(ii) if  > , the government coalition is made by the middle class and by the rich.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. When  is relatively low ( < ), the
probability that the poor are agenda setter at round 2 is also low, and so is their expected
utility at the second round. This means that their vote is relatively cheap to buy at round
1. On the other hand, when  is relatively small, 1    is relatively high, and so is the
probability of the rich of being agenda setter at round 2, which in turn implies that their
expected utility at the second round is high and their vote is costly to buy at round 1.
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Therefore, there exists a level of  su¢ ciently small that the middle class prefers to make a
government coalition with poor because their vote is cheaper to buy (than that of the rich).
Clearly, the opposite is true when  is relatively high ( > ). At the threshold , the
middle class is just indi¤erent between forming a coalition with the rich or with the poor.16
Two issues are worth mentioning. The rst is that the sincere voting assumption is
important for the result in Proposition 2, as otherwise the poor could vote for the rich when
they anticipate that their representatives will not be part of the government. The second
is that our result is instead independent on the status quo policy assumed. It is clear that
changing the status quo may imply a variation in the government coalitions observed at
round 2 with the poor not being always the cheapest to buy. However, what is key for
our results is that the expected utility of poor and rich at round 2 is increasing in their
probability of being agenda setter at that stage of the game. And this is always the case
because the utility of any group (poor or rich) when it is agenda setter is higher than when
it is not (independently that it belongs or not to the ruling coalition). The status quo may
a¤ect the absolute level of the expected utility of each class at round 2 for a given level of 
and, therefore, the level of the threshold . However, the middle class will prefer the poor
to the rich when  is lower than this threshold, and vice versa.
4 The Size of Government Across Constitutions and
Coalitions
While the tax rate chosen under a majoritarian constitution is only a function of the income
of the rich (relative to the average one), the tax rate in a consensual democracy under the
two possible coalitions is a function of the income distribution, i.e. of both the incomes of the
classes (yp; yb; y; yr) and the value of . A comparison of these tax rates is not straightforward
due to the strong non-linearity present in the rst order conditions dening them. However,
by making some assumptions on the levels of income of the classes and the utility function
of the individuals we can state the results presented and discussed below. First, we assume
a power function specication for the utility derived from the public good: H(gj) = A(gj),
16The result in Proposition 2 can be regarded as an application of the general principle by which, in
coalition formation games, it can be advantageous to be in a relatively weak bargaining position as that
increases the likelihood of becoming a member of the coalition. This is the opposite of what happens in a
Nash bargaining process where a lower bargaining power only reduces the share of the surplus of which one
can appropriate.
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with  2 (0; 1) and A > 0.
Result 1. If yp = 0 and the income of the rich is su¢ ciently high relative to the average
income, then the taxes set in equilibrium can be ordered as follows:  r <  1;b;r <  1;b;p.17
Proof. See Appendix.
Without the above assumptions it is not possible to derive further analytical results and,
therefore, we have run several numerical simulations. The simulations show that the two
assumptions on the income of the poor and the rich, which guarantee that Result 1 holds
and can be proved analytically, are not necessary. Nevertheless, these assumptions provide
an insight into the characteristics of the income distribution that lead to that result. In
particular, the result that  r <  1;b;r <  1;b;p for all  is easy to obtain when the income of
the poor yp and the income of the rich yr are respectively low and high with respect to the
average income y or, in other words, when there is enough dispersion in the income of the
three classes.
From the numerical analysis we have obtained two interesting results. First, a level
of yr su¢ ciently high relative to y is enough to obtain the taxation ranking of Result 1
( r <  1;b;r <  1;b;p) even when yp and yb are both very close to y. Second, with an
extremely equal income distribution, taxation in majoritarian democracy is always higher
than taxation in consensual democracy (regardless of the ruling coalition). These results can
be illustrated using two parameterizations for the income of the three classes.18 The rst is:
yp = 0:9, yb = 0:95, y = 1, yr = 1:1. In the second one we just change the income of the rich
and use yr = 4. The rst parameterization corresponds to a very equal society given that the
income of the poor is only 10% lower than the average income while the income of the rich
is only 10% higher than the mean.19 Figure 2 shows the tax rates obtained with these two
parameterizations. In this case the tax rate set in consensual democracy is lower than the
tax rate set in majoritarian democracy. The increase in the income of the rich from 1:1 to 4
leads to a reduction in the tax rate set in majoritarian democracy higher than the reduction
in the tax rate of the middle class and rich coalition up to the point that the ranking of tax
17A graphical representation of the tax rates is provided in Figure 1.
18In the numerical simulations we have used the power function specication for H() with A = 1 and
 = 0:5.
19In this case the variation in the size of the classes, and therefore of , cannot change the fact that the
distribution is very equal even when there are many poor ( high).
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rates of Result 1 generally holds.20 The explanation for this result is the following.
The scal policy of a single group government should involve, other things equal (i.e. if
all groups have a similar income as it is in the rst parameterization), a higher tax rate and
total expenditure than the policy of a two groups government coalition regardless of how the
tax revenues are divided among the public goods provided. Indeed, recall that a public good
is provided only if the group which likes it is part of the government coalition and the optimal
tax rate of a group is such that the marginal cost of taxation equals the marginal benet
from the public good provision. While the marginal cost of taxation is independent on the
number of public goods that are nanced with the tax revenues (i.e. the number of groups in
the government coalition), the marginal benet from that increase in taxation decreases with
the number of public goods among which this increase in taxation is split. This implies that
the tax rate should decrease with the number of groups in the government coalition, which
in turn implies that, other things equal, the tax rate in majoritarian democracy should be
higher than tax rate in consensual democracy.
However, we now need to explain why Result 1 and most numerical simulations lead to the
opposite result, namely that generally the tax rate in consensual democracy is higher than
the tax rate in majoritarian democracy. This result is due to the fact that in majoritarian
democracy scal policy is decided by the group with the highest level of income (the rich),
while in consensual democracy scal policy is chosen by a government coalition representing
two groups with an average level of income lower than the income of the rich. Similarly,
the middle class and poor coalition taxes and spends more than the middle class and rich
one exactly because it contains a group (the poor) with lower income. If the incomes of
the three classes are su¢ ciently spread, then the latter e¤ect more than compensate the
e¤ect (described above) generated by the number of groups in the government leading to the
taxation ranking of Result 1 ( r <  1;b;r <  1;b;p).
There are also other features of the relationship between the tax rates across constitutions
for di¤erent income distributions that deserve to be more deeply analyzed. Our numerical
simulations have shown that taxation in majoritarian democracy is lower than taxation under
the middle class and poor coalition even if the dispersion in the income levels of the three
classes is very small.21 A slightly higher spread in this distribution is necessary if we want the
20Notice that the tax rate of the middle class and poor coalition is not a¤ected by the income of the rich.
21For example, with the above parameterization (yp = 0:9, yb = 0:95, y = 1) an income level of the rich
higher than 1.3 is enough to obtain  r < 1;b;p for all  2 (0; 1).
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tax rate of the middle class and rich coalition to be higher than the tax rate in majoritarian
democracy for all  > . As it will be clear in the next section, we are interested in the
case where  r <  1;b;r when  > 
 and the numerical simulations suggest that this result
holds if there is a minimum degree of dispersion in the income levels of the three groups.
Indeed, using the previous parametrization (yp = 0:9, yb = 0:95, y = 1) and increasing the
income of the rich to 1:6 is enough to have  r <  1;b;r for all  > 
 and a further increase
in yr implies that  r <  1;b;r also for most values of  < 
.22 The result of the numerical
simulation with such parameters is reported in Figure 3, while Figure 4 presents an example
with a di¤erent parameterization.23
5 Income Inequality and Constitutional Choice
Having characterized the political equilibrium of the model under the two possible institu-
tional arrangements, we now turn to the question of which of them would be chosen ex ante
by society, when the constitution is endogenous. We assume that the process of constitu-
tional choice takes place in an original position where individuals know their class-status
and preferences and before any other politico-economic interaction. We also assume that the
decision is taken by simple majority voting, and that the available alternatives are the two
constitutional regimes we have considered. Given that there is no veil of ignorance and un-
certainty, individuals correctly anticipate what their level of utility would be under the two
possible constitutions, and vote consequently. Finally, we assume that there is a minimum
degree of dispersion in the income levels of the three groups so that the tax rates ranking of
Result 1 holds, or at least that the tax rate set under the middle class and rich coalition is
higher than the tax rate under majoritarian democracy when  > .
Proposition 3. If  <  society chooses consensual democracy while it prefers ma-
joritarian democracy when  > .
Proof. It is clear that for the rich and the middle class the constitutional choice has a
trivial, albeit opposite, solution. Since majoritarian democracy expresses the dictatorship of
22Moreover, notice that an increase in the income of the rich always leads to a reduction in .
23The results presented above are robust to all parameterizations we have used. Additional numerical
simulations are available from the authors. It is also worth noting that all simulations conrms that the
utility of the middle class in the government coalition with the rich wb
1;b;r
is monotonically increasing in ,
while the utility of the middle class in the coalition with the poor wb
1;b;p
is strictly monotonically decreasing
in , so that  is unique.
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the rich, they will prefer it unconditionally. Similarly, given that the middle class has the
relative majority of votes, which allows her to be the rst agenda setter in the legislative
bargaining game, she will prefer unconditionally the consensual constitution.24 The most
interesting decision is the one of the poor, who turn out to be the swing voters. The poor
do gain from the higher political inclusion which is typical of consensual democracy, only if
they are part of the government coalition as partner of the middle class agenda setter. In
this case they are clearly better-o¤ than they are in a majoritarian setting.25 However, we
know that this needs not to be always the case, since the ruling coalition does not include
them whenever  2 (; 1). In this instance the poor are actually worse-o¤ in a consensual
democracy: they do pay higher taxes (see the discussion in the previous section) but get as
well no provision at all of their specic public good. Therefore, if  2 (0; ) the majority
prefers consensual democracy while majoritarian democracy is chosen when  2 (; 1).
We now present two mean preserving spread of the distribution of income which show
that an increase in income inequality makes more likely the adoption of a majoritarian
democracy.
Mean Preserving Spread 1. We rst consider a transformation of the income distri-
bution that a¤ects the size of the three classes. We suppose that mp and mr increase and
that mb decreases in such a way that both the size of the population and the average level
of income y remain constant. Then, society has a smaller middle class, more rich and more
poor; that is, it is more unequal.
We now show that, whilst the threshold  is not a¤ected by this transformation, the
value of  necessarily increases. Therefore, it becomes more likely that  belongs to the
interval (; 1) and that a majoritarian democracy is chosen. To this end, let us consider
the denition of the average income, y = mpyp + mbyb + mryr, and divide both sides by
(1 mb) = (mp+mr) taking into account that  = mp= (mp +mr). Then, rearranging terms
we get
(10) yr   (yr   yp) = y + m
b
1 mb (y   y
b):
24It is trivial to deduce that the middle class is always better-o¤ in a consensual democracy than in a
majoritarian one. Indeed, notice that in consensual democracy the middle class would always have the option
of replicating the majoritarian outcome by o¤ering to the rich of forming a coalition and implementing their
own preferred policy.
25If the poor are part of the government coalition they get a utility at least as high as their income level,
while in majoritarian democracy they always get a lower level of utility because of positive taxation and no
provision of their public good.
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A decrease in mb implies a reduction in the right hand side of (10) as y > yb. Therefore, 
must increase given that yr > yp. This means that  can also be interpreted as a measure
of income inequality. Again, our model predicts that when income inequality is relatively
low ( < ) society prefers a consensual democracy, while it chooses a majoritarian system
when income inequality is relatively high ( > ).
Mean Preserving Spread 2. Another mean preserving spread we consider is generated
by a transformation of both the size of the classes and the income of the rich. In particular,
we analyze the e¤ect on constitutional choice of an increase in inequality caused by the
increase in the income of the rich, accompanied by an equi-proportional increase in the
number of the rich and of the poor (and a reduction of the middle class) so that both  and
y are una¤ected.26
Given that  remains constant, we need to determine how  changes so to understand
which constitution is more likely to be chosen by the society. To this end, we need to nd
out how the two schedules representing the utility of the middle class under the two possible
coalitions vary as yr increases. First, observe that the utility of the middle class in the
coalition with the poor wb
1;b;p
does not depend on the income of the rich yr and therefore
it is not a¤ected by any variation of it. The utility of the middle class in the government
coalition with rich wb1;b;r is instead a function of y
r. We are not able to show analytically how
this schedule changes with the income of the rich but the numerical simulations we discussed
in the previous section point out that it shifts upward (i.e. wb1;b;r increases) as y
r goes up
leading to a reduction in .27 This means that this increase in income inequality leads to a
reduction of the range (0; ) where consensual democracy is chosen, and therefore it makes
more likely the adoption of a majoritarian constitution.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that, although the model is purely static, it contains forces
that would make it dynamically stable. If income inequality is relatively high, society should
choose a majoritarian constitution. The scal policy in this constitutional system should
favour the rich and therefore not reduce (or even increase) the initial degree of inequality.
Then, society should continue to prefer a majoritarian constitution. Conversely, if income
26This particular mean preserving spread corresponds to the shocks driving, according to our theory, the
cases of constitutional change in France, Germany and Italy that we discuss next.
27More precisely, it is possible to observe for certain parameterizations that wb1;b;r shifts upward for almost
all  except for values close to one where it shift down. However, this is always irrelevant because it happens
for values of  very far from .
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inequality is relatively low, society will prefer a consensual democracy under which scal
policy generally reects the preferences of middle class and poor. This should lead to the
provision of public goods that reduce or maintain the initial level of inequality and, therefore,
a majority for a consensual constitution.
6 Some Evidence on Class Politics and Constitutional
Choice
The theory presented in this paper has many interesting predictions. The main result is that
income inequality has an important e¤ect on the choice of the constitution. While a test
of this prediction is reported in the next section, we here discuss other worth emphasizing
results of our theory in relation to the available evidence.
A rst prediction of our theory is that consensual democracies should have bigger govern-
ments than majoritarian ones and a larger part of government expenditure should go to the
advantage of a greater number of social groups and, in particular, to lower income individuals
(the poor and the middle class). As emphasized in the Introduction, these results are in line
with the existing theoretical literature (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Lizzeri and Persico,
2001) and with the empirical results of Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004), Milesi-Ferretti,
Perotti and Rostagno (2002) and Lijphart (1999).
The novelty of our theory is in the specic mechanism leading to this result. It is usually
argued that public expenditure is higher under proportional electoral systems than under
majoritarian ones because the former favours the representation of many groups and the
formation of multi-party coalition governments, which in turn spend more because they need
to please broader and more diverse constituencies than single-party executives. Instead, in
our model, the same prediction is due to a selection bias in the composition of the government
coalition as consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled relatively more often
by center-left coalitions, while the scally conservative right should have an advantage in
majoritarian constitutions. While we do not pursue here an empirical analysis on this point
(although interesting, this is not the key nding of our paper), it is worth noting that
such a result is consistent with the existent empirical evidence about the e¤ects of the
governments ideology on scal policy outcomes suggesting that left-wing executives are
willing to tax and spend more than right-wing ones (see on this Alesina, Roubini and Cohen,
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1997, and the references cited therein, as well as Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002). Our
mechanism is also in accordance with the ndings of Powell (2002) which, in a sample of
17 advanced democracies for the period 1978-1994, obtains that 58% of the governments
in PR systems were leftist, while this fraction was only 37% in majoritarian democracies.
A similar result can be obtained using an index of partisanship of the government on the
left-right dimension compiled by Cusack (1997). The index ranges from 1 (extreme left) to
4 (extreme right) and it is provided for 16 OECD countries for the periods 1950-59, 1960-69,
1970-79, 1980-91.28 Over the whole period 1950-91, the average value of the Cusack index
is 3.49 in majoritarian democracies (Australia, Canada, U.K., U.S. and France) and 2.92 in
consensual democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan) and this di¤erence is statistically signicant
at 5% level.29 These results corroborate the prediction of our model according to which
consensual democracies should be ruled relatively more often by center-left governments
whereas majoritarian democracy should advantage conservative parties.30
Our model has the prediction that the poor may vote for the rich in the majoritarian
systems. This nding is in accordance with previous results obtained in models of public
provision of private goods (e.g. Epple and Romano, 1996) where extreme coalitions(i.e.
coalitions made up by the rich and the poor) emerge in equilibrium, and o¤er a rational
explanation for the Reagan Democratphenomenon (see Greenberg, 1996), namely for the
working-class voter supporting low tax and socially conservative policies.31
The results of our model can also help us to better understand the relationship between
the distribution of income and scal policy outcomes. The standard result of the political
economy models based on the theory of the median voter (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981) is
that higher (pre-tax) inequality should be expected to generate political support for a larger
scal redistribution of resources. This theory, however, does not seem to be corroborated by
the data (e.g. Perotti, 1996, Bénabou, 2000) which, if anything, indicate that more equal
28Basically, the index is based on the computation of the political center of gravity of a government,
dened as the average ideological collocation of the parties of the coalition on the left-right continuum,
weighted by the share of seats of each of them (see Cusack, 1997, Table 1 and pp. 381-2 for more details).
29The results do not change if we consider the subperiods, where it is also possible to observe that the
variability of this index over time is rather small. For consensual democracies the index gets the following
average values: 2.95 in 1950-59, 2.91 in 1960-69, 2.76 in 1970-79, and 3.06 in 1980-91. The average values
for majoritarian democracies are: 3.72 in 1950-59, 3.46 in 1960-69, 3.41 in 1970-79, and 3.39 in 1980-91.
30Our results also provide a theoretical ground to the nding of Scheve and Stasavage (2007) that, in a
sample of 13 countries for the period 1976-2000, government of the right (left) are associated with more
(less) income inequality.
31We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this to our attention.
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societies tend to redistribute more rather then less. Our theory suggests that the absence or a
negative relationship between inequality and redistribution may be due to the fact that more
unequal societies are more likely to choose a majoritarian system, which in turn generates
lower redistribution.32 Moreover, income inequality may have ambiguous e¤ects also for a
given constitution. In a consensual democracy, an increase in inequality generally leads to an
increase in taxation and redistribution for a given government coalition, but has the opposite
e¤ect if it leads to the formation of a center-right majority instead than a center-left one.
In a majoritarian democracy, more inequality a¤ects taxation and redistribution only if it is
associated to a variation in the income of the rich.
Another prediction of our model concerns the preferences of the social classes for the
constitution. The rich should prefer the majoritarian democracy, the middle class the con-
sensual one, while the attitude of the poor should depend on the level of income inequality.
They are supposed to prefer the consensual system for low levels of inequality and vice versa.
Identifying the preferences of the various social classes for the type of constitution is not an
easy task and it goes beyond the scope of this paper to provide a deep analysis on this point.
However, we now present some historical examples of constitutional choice that appear to
be in accordance with our theory. In particular, we rst discuss three cases (U.S., U.K.
and Chile) of choice of majoritarian constitutions supporting the idea that the rich prefer
this political system. Then, we analyze the adoption of consensual constitutions in conti-
nental European countries in the rst half of the 20th century and argue that this choice
was generally inuenced by center-left forces in a period of low and/or declining income
inequality.
The U.S. have the oldest written constitution of the world, dating to 1787. It was
drafted by a Constitutional Convention of delegates from all States (with the exception of
Rhode Island). Apart from some relatively minor changes, it has remained essentially the
same up today. An economic analysis of the American constitution has been provided by
Beard (1913), which shares with ours the basic premise that key constitutional principles
ought to be interpreted as reecting the interests of particular social groups or classes as
opposed to the public good. In particular, Beard points out that the economic interests
of the members of the Convention essentially corresponded only to those of the rich (the
32Our model of endogenous selection of the constitution may also help explaining why some recent studies,
as Scheve and Stasavage (2007), do not nd an e¤ect of PR on the reduction of income inequality. Most equal
societies or those that tend more rapidly towards equalization are likeliest to have adopted and retained PR.
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commercial and nancial elite as well as of the landlords), who were concerned of securing
individual property rights and of guaranteeing the best possible institutional framework for
private economic activity. Vice versa, the middle and the lower classes had very little if any
voice at all in the Convention, due to both the strong franchise restriction of the time and
the low class-consciousness of many of the less well-o¤ among the enfranchised. Beard
also demonstrates the extraordinary awareness of the economic elite, and of its political
and intellectual leadership, about the nature of her interests in the process of constitution
making.33 Remarkably, in the tenth number of The Federalist, Madison argues that The
rst object of government is the protection of the diversity in the faculties of men, from
which the rights of property originateand that this requires the creation of an institutional
framework preventing the exploitation of the rich by the lower classes.
England has the oldest unwritten constitution of the world. It consists in a collection
of di¤erent documents including the Magna Charta of 1215, the Bill of Rights of 1689,
commonly observed practices and conceptions, as well as some laws. Despite experiencing
signicant transformations over time, including a gradual extension of franchise since the
rst decades of the 19th century (1832, 1867 and 1884), the constitution always remained
majoritarian. The making of the English constitution, like that one of the U.S., occurred
over a period of time during which the political voice of the upper classes was overwhelming
and is another example about the preference of the rich for the majoritarian model.
The rich have occasionally been able to impose their constitutional preferences even in
much more recent times and, as suggested by our theory, they have opted for the majoritarian
model. A notable example is the majoritarian constitution of Chile implemented under the
leadership of General Pinochet, who arguably represented the political and economic interests
of the elites. A politico-economic analysis of this constitution has been o¤ered by Baldez
and Carey (1999), who assert (at p. 52) that The Chilean military regime consciously
crafted the 1980 Constitution, the budget process, and the electoral system in order to
constrain the policy outcomes generated by elected civilian politicians. To a certain extent,
the institutional engineers appear to have succeeded particularly in designing an electoral
system that has disproportionately rewarded the right and a budget process that generally
encourages scal austerity.
The model of consensual democracy has been adopted extensively in continental Europe
33This also conrms that our assumption on the absence of a veil of ignorance in choosing the constitution
is appropriate.
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in the rst half of the 20th century. Our theory predicts that this should have been the choice
of the center and leftist parties in the presence of low income inequality. Both conditions are
not easy to identify precisely for many countries but, as we now show, the available historical
evidence is broadly consistent with this result of our theory.
Proportional electoral systems have been rst introduced in Scandinavian countries (Den-
mark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) and elsewhere in Northern Europe (the Netherlands)
between the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. By 1921, all Scandinavian countries
had adopted some form of proportional representation (PR) and none of them has been
discarded afterwards, even for a short period (see for instance Lakeman and Lambert, 1963).
Other European countries, such as France, Germany and Italy have adopted PR in 1919,
after World War I. This system was abandoned at some point during the interwar period
and then reintroduced immediately after World War II.34
The rst question to address is whether inequality was low in the above cited countries.
Although the available data on income inequality are limited and not very precise, it can
be argued this seems to have been the case. Piketty (2007) (see also the references therein
cited) documents the occurrence in France during the period 1914-1945 of a sharp fall in
inequality associated to a sensible drop in the top percentile income share.35 This trend
has been driven primarily by the shocks represented by the two World Wars (especially the
second one) and by the events of the interwar period (ination and the Great Depression).
As we said, in the immediate aftermath of both wars, France switched to PR. Piketty (2007)
makes clear that this reduction in income inequality was not limited to France but common
to many European countries, especially those that were hit by the two World Wars.36 This is
consistent with countries as Italy and Germany switching to PR after the end of both wars.37
For European countries that chose their constitution at the beginning of the 20th century, we
can get some data on income distribution from Morrisson (2000). He suggests that income
34In particular, Denmark adopted PR in 1920, Norway in 1921, Sweden in 1907, Finland in 1906, the
Netherlands in 1917, France in 1919 and 1946, Germany in 1919 and 1945, Italy in 1919 and 1948. France
abandoned PR after the 1924 election with the reversion to the second ballot in single-member constituencies
that used until the war. The suspension of PR in Italy and Germany followed instead the rise of fascism and
nazism respectively.
35The reduction of income inequality generated by a reduction in the top percentile income share cor-
responds to a change in the income distribution equivalent to our mean preserving spread 2 that we have
analyzed in the previous section.
36For example, the available evidence from Morrison (2000, p. 232) also conrms that income inequality
in Germany strongly decreased from 1913 to 1926 and that it was low after World War II.
37Austria also adopted PR at the end of World War I.
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inequality in Denmark at the time of the adoption of PR (1920) was overall relatively low.38
For Norway, Morrisson (Table 2, p. 224) documents a fall in the Gini coe¢ cient from 0.68
in 1855 to 0.34 in 1920, a low level of inequality consistent with the adoption of PR in 1921.
The Netherlands adopted a proportional electoral law as early as 1917. While no precise
evidence at the time of the adoption of the constitution is available, income inequality seems
to have generally decreased in the Netherlands since the end of the 19th century.
The second question we need to answer is whether the demand of adoption of PR came
from center-left parties as our theory suggests. A discussion of this issue is presented in
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) where they argue that the di¤usion of PR across Continen-
tal Europe (for the above cited countries) in the 20th century was related to the political
strength enjoyed by the left and by the workersmovement that succeeded in imposing it
to the conservative forces. An exception to this pattern is represented by Sweden where the
choice of a proportional electoral system in 1907 was made by the right that feared to lose
representation after the extension of franchise. This case is in contradiction with our theory
and in accordance with Rokkan (1970) which explains the introduction of PR in Europe
as a strategic choice of the traditional 19th century liberal parties to preserve part of their
political power in spite of the gradual franchise extension, and of the consequent increasing
importance of new mass political parties, in particular Socialist ones.
While the historical example of Sweden, and probably of other countries,39 may not be
in accordance with our theory, the broad picture that emerges from the above discussion
is that there exists some historical evidence supporting our theoretical results. The recent
history on constitutional choice also provides some useful information. For example, at the
beginning of the 1990s, the Eastern European countries of the former soviet block have
made a transition to democracy. These countries had an equal income distribution at that
time (see Table 2 for details) and have generally chosen a consensual constitution. On the
other hand, there are also consensual democracies in Europe that have recently experienced
an increase in inequality. For these countries, it is natural to ask whether PR will come to
question or abandon. By the time being, there have been very few changes of electoral rules
in advanced democracies without any clear pattern and, therefore, to answer this question
38The data on income inequality in Denmark are based on the maximum equalization coe¢ cient (MEC),
which indicates the share of total income which has to be transferred from the population with income above
the average to those below in order to achieve an equal distribution. This index falls sharply from 0.50 to
0.35 between 1870 and 1900, and was 0.36 in 1925.
39On the other hand, we admit that there is no unanimous consensus among political scientists about the
Alesina and Glaesers view.
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we will probably need some more time. It is important to keep in mind, however, that an
increase in inequality may not be enough to produce a constitutional change, as this requires
inequality increasing above a certain threshold. And this may in turn be anticipated by
center-left governments that have an interest in this not taking place.
7 Empirical Evidence on Inequality and Constitutional
Choice
In this section we test the main prediction of our paper that more unequal countries are
expected to choose a majoritarian democracy while equal societies should prefer a consen-
sual constitution. We test this prediction by analyzing the relationship between the type of
constitution adopted and the income inequality of the country at the time, or before, the
constitution was chosen in order to avoid problems of endogeneity.40 Given that constitu-
tional reforms are rare, a feature potentially representing an equilibrium outcome according
to our model, we perform a cross-sectional analysis using the dataset compiled by Persson
and Tabellini (2003, 2004) (PT from now on) to analyze the economic e¤ects of constitutions.
As a measure of income inequality, we employ the Gini index and use the dataset compiled
by Deininger and Squire (1996).
PT report the variables maj and pres that dene the electoral system and the form of
government for 85 countries that have been selected on the base that they can be classied
as free or partly free democracies for the period 1990-98.41 PT classify the electoral rule
and the form of government considering the countries at the beginning of the 1990s. We
have taken this classication and identied the rst year when this constitution (represented
by maj and pres) was rst introduced and summarized it in the variable yearcons. Then,
we have selected a Gini coe¢ cient for each country from the Deininger and Squire dataset
according to the following rules. We have rst considered the high quality data and selected
the Gini coe¢ cient correspondent to the year when the constitution was introduced, which is
given by the variable yearcons. If there was not a data in that year, we have gone backward
and selected the rst Gini coe¢ cient available. When there was no data before the year
40In fact, our theory predicts that income inequality determines the choice of the constitution, which in
turn a¤ects the distribution of income through its e¤ects on scal policy outcomes.
41In particular, maj is a dummy variable equal to 1 if all the lower house is elected under plurality rule
and 0 under a proportional (or mixed) electoral system, while pres is a dummy variable for the form of
government, equal to 1 in presidential regimes and 0 in parliamentary democracies (see PT, 2003, ch. 4, for
details and clarications).
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of the constitution, we have taken the rst Gini coe¢ cient available after that year with
the constraint that it was not more than 5 years older.42 Following this procedure, we have
obtained a high quality Gini coe¢ cient for 43 countries. When we did not nd a high quality
Gini coe¢ cient with this procedure, we have relied on the other (low quality) data available
in this dataset following the same procedure. When more than one coe¢ cient was available
in the same year, we have taken the average. This has allowed us to obtain a Gini coe¢ cient
for a total of 57 countries.43 The data from Deininger and Squire specify whether the Gini
coe¢ cient is computed using information on income or on expenditure, if the income is gross
or net of taxes and if the recipient unit is an individual or a household. Deininger and Squire
argue that the most important distinction is between the Gini coe¢ cients that are based on
information on income and those based on expenditure. In order to ensure intertemporal and
international comparability, they strongly suggest adjusting for di¤erences between income-
based and expenditure-based coe¢ cients by adding 6.6 points to the latter. We have therefore
made this adjustment and denoted with giniycai the Gini coe¢ cient with this correction.
An important point that we need to address concerns the classication of the countries
into majoritarian and consensual democracies. As explained before, this classication is
straightforward for parliamentary systems given that the executive is accountable to the
parliament so that the electoral rule, majoritarian versus proportional, is enough to classify
the type of democracy. In presidential regimes scal policy is the outcome of a bargaining
process between the president and the legislative assembly. If the assembly is elected with
plurality rule, then it is reasonable to classify these systems as majoritarian democracies given
that both subjects that have a role in scal policy decisions are elected with a winner-takes-
all process and are, therefore, expected to have the same scally conservative preferences.
Instead, when the congress is elected with PR, it is important to understand the power
of the president in scal policy decisions (see footnote 9). In our sample, the presidential
42The choice of taking a Gini coe¢ cient that refers to few years later the constitutional choice is based
on the same rationale that has led PT to exclude the reforms that some countries have made during the
1990s in their cross-sectional analysis for the period 1990-98. They argue that it takes some time before
constitutional reforms have an impact on scal policy outcomes (see p. 88). However, if this is true (as we
believe), then there will also need some time before the constitution has an impact on income inequality
given that this e¤ect should mainly work through scal policy.
43Cyprus and South Africa are not in the dataset although we had a Gini coe¢ cient for these countries.
Cyprus has been excluded because we had a Gini coe¢ cient for one year only and two constitutional choices
very close to that year. While the more reasonable constitution would in principle favour our hypothesis,
including Cyprus with either constitutions leaves our results unchanged. Details can be found in the data
appendix. South Africa has been excluded because it is an outlier and an inuential observation. An
additional appendix (available from the authors) shows that the inclusion of this observation in the sample
has a very large impact on the estimates.
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systems with PR are characterized by a relative powerful president and should, therefore,
be considered majoritarian democracies. This is conrmed by three considerations. First,
PT classify as presidential only those regimes where the condence of the assembly is not
necessary for the executive. Second, the presidential countries with PR in our dataset are
classied as direct presidential in the Database of Political Institutions.44 Finally, it is
worth emphasizing that almost all of these countries in our sample are located in Latin
America and while the exact distribution of the legislative power varies across countries,
according to many scholars of comparative politics the president in Latin American countries
typically plays a key role in the legislative process regarding scal policy.45
Based on the above considerations, we have structured our empirical analysis as follows.
First, we have analyzed the relationship between income inequality and electoral system in
the sub-sample of parliamentary democracies. This choice is justied by the fact that our
model describes precisely this system and also allows us to consider a more homogenous
sample. Second, we have considered the whole sample classifying the type of democracy on
the base of the electoral system only. In this case, the presidential systems with PR enter as
consensual democracies. As we will see, this is the worst specication for our theory because
the income distribution in these countries is generally very unequal. Finally, we develop the
empirical work with the classication that we consider more reasonable and closer to our
model, namely by classifying the presidential regimes with PR as majoritarian systems.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for income inequality in various samples. Among
the parliamentary democracies, the countries with a majoritarian electoral rule are more
unequal than those with PR. The di¤erence in the average Gini coe¢ cient is almost 10 points
and it is statistically signicant at the 1% level. The unconditional correlation between the
44In this dataset, compiled by Beck et al. (2000), three elements are considered: a) veto power: president
can veto legislation and the parliament needs a supermajority to override the veto; b) appoint prime minister:
president can appoint and dismiss prime minister and/or other ministers; c) dissolve parliament: president
can dissolve parliament and call for new elections. The system is a direct presidential if (a) is true, or if
(b) and (c) are true.
45For instance, Morgenstern (2002) argues that Latin American legislatures are only reactive, namely
they only have the ability to amend/veto legislative proposals made by the president. Such prerogatives
are also limited as presidents facing a hostile legislature typically have many ways to bypass it by using
their unilateral powers, such as various types of decrees and regulatory rule making, as well as their own
veto powers on parliamentary deliberations. According to Cox and Morgenstern (2002 p. 461) ...presidents
in Latin America regularly make policy decisions almost unilaterally. Presidents in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela have tremendous advantages in structuring the
budget process, as the legislatures there are constitutionally restricted from making signicant changes.
As a result, according to the same authors, Latin American legislatures are hindered by a lack of time,
resources and experience. This combination of constitutional and organizational limits has converted many
Latin American presidents into virtual budget dictators.
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Gini coe¢ cient and a majoritarian electoral system is 0.485. We observe that the average
income inequality in presidential regimes is high (the Gini index is about 49) and independent
on the electoral formula of the assembly. In our view, this is consistent with the majoritarian
characteristics of both systems. When we consider the whole sample and distinguish on the
base of the electoral rule, we nd that countries with plurality rule have higher income
inequality than those with PR (signicant at 10% level), but this di¤erence is lower with
respect to the sample of parliamentary democracies. The unconditional correlation between
the Gini coe¢ cient and the electoral system is positive but not very high (it is 0.174).
Finally, the last part of the table shows the statistics when presidential systems with PR are
classied as majoritarian democracies. Majoritarian democracies are much more unequal
than consensual ones and the di¤erence in average inequality is about 13 points with a
statistically signicance at 1% level (the correlation between Gini coe¢ cient and majoritarian
democracy is also high, 0.532) .
Panel A of Table 2 reports the majoritarian and consensual countries in each quartile
of the income distribution for the sample of parliamentary democracies. The rst quartile
contains just one majoritarian country and seven consensual ones, while we observe the oppo-
site pattern in the last quartile of the distribution. The number of majoritarian (consensual)
countries is also monotonically increasing (decreasing) in the degree of income inequality.
Panel B shows the results of the same analysis for the whole sample when we consider the
classication based on the electoral system only. As expected from the above discussion, we
observe a positive relationship between degree of income inequality and number of majoritar-
ian democracies, though this is weaker than in the sample of parliamentary democracies. The
positive link between inequality and majoritarian electoral system can be appreciated if we
consider two groups, countries with inequality below and above the median. The number of
majoritarian countries with income inequality higher than the median is the double of those
with inequality lower than the median. Finally, Panel C provides the results of this analysis
when presidential regimes with an assembly elected with PR are classied as majoritarian
systems. The positive relationship between income inequality and majoritarian democracy is
very strong as, with the exception of one country, there are no consensual democracies with
inequality above the median. We can therefore conclude that the unconditional relationship
between income inequality and constitution is consistent with our theory.
We now present the results of logit regressions when the relationship between inequality
and constitution is analyzed conditioning for di¤erent variables that may potentially a¤ect
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the choice of the constitution. The most important variable is ethnic fragmentation whose
importance for constitutional choice has been emphasized by Lijphart (1999) and Aghion,
Alesina and Trebbi (2004). We always control for it by including the variables ethnic and
language from Alesina et al. (2004). This allows us to disentangle di¤erent kinds of hetero-
geneity as the rst one is based on a broad measure of ethnicity while the second is strictly
based on language. We also control for religious fractionalization using the variable religion
taken from the same authors, but we do not include it in the baseline specication because
Alesina et al. argue that the endogeneity problems for this variable may be more serious.46
We control for country size and level of development by including the log of population
in 1960 (lpop_60 ) and the GDP per capita expressed relative to the U.S. in 1960 (y_60 )
taken from the Penn World Table 6.1.47 We consider three regional dummies to take into
account the role of geography. In particular, we use a dummy variable for continental location
in Africa (africa), in eastern and southern Asia (asiae) and southern and central America
including the Caribbean (laam). To take into account the possible e¤ects of religious and
cultural factors, we control for the percentage of the population in each country professing
the Protestant religion in 1980 (prot80 ), the percentage of the population belonging to the
Roman Catholic religion in 1980 (catho80 ), and if the majority of population is Confucian-
Buddhist-Zen (confu). PT argue that ex-British colonies tend to be parliamentary and
majoritarian while all former Spanish-Portuguese colonies are presidential. To take into
account these e¤ects, we control for British (col_uk), for Spanish-Portuguese (col_esp) and
other (col_oth) colonial origins. All the above variables are taken from the PT dataset.
Table 3 presents the relationship between constitution and income inequality in the sam-
ple of parliamentary democracies. Column (1) shows the results for our baseline specication
where we consider the degree of income inequality and of ethnic fragmentation. Higher in-
equality is positively correlated with a majoritarian electoral system and this relationship is
statistically signicant at 1%. The quantitative e¤ect of an increase in income inequality on
46The variables ethnic, language and religion take values in the range between zero and one that are
increasing in the degree of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization respectively. There is no data for
the variable language for El Salvador.
47There are a few countries for which the data on the level of income per capita relative to the U.S. and
the size of population are not available in 1960. In these cases, we have taken the rst year available. This
is equivalent to assuming that the ratio between the GDP per capita of these countries and that one of the
U.S. has remained unchanged between 1960 and the rst year available. As a robustness check, we have also
run regressions with the log of the GDP per capita in 1960. For the countries where GDP per capita in 1960
was not available, we have multiplied their per capita income relative to the U.S. in the rst year available
with U.S. per capita income in 1960. Using the log of this variable instead of the GDP per capita expressed
relative to U.S. yields basically the same results.
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the probability of adopting a majoritarian system is also very high as the marginal e¤ect at
the mean is 0.03.48 In columns (2) and (3) we control for the population and level of income
respectively. In column (4), we include dummies for Africa and Asia while the dummy for
Latin America is omitted because the four parliamentary democracies in this region are all
majoritarian. Column (5) shows the results when we add the religious characteristics of
each country that are likely to be correlated with cultural factors. In all specications, we
nd that the relationship between inequality and constitution is unchanged with respect to
the baseline one.49 In column (6), we control for colonial origins and nd that the corre-
lation between income inequality and majoritarian democracy has the expected sign but it
is not statistically signicant at standard levels. This is due to the inclusion of the dummy
variable for former British colonies.50 In this sample, 8 out of 9 ex-British colonies have a
majoritarian electoral rule. It is worth noting that these former British colonies are also very
unequal. The mean Gini coe¢ cient for these 9 countries is 46.58 and the most equal one
has a coe¢ cient of 38.1. This in turn implies that all former British colonies have a degree
of inequality above average (see Table 1). Such collinearity between the Gini coe¢ cient and
British colonial origin, combined with measurement errors in inequality, could be at the root
of inequality becoming insignicant. In other words, while controlling for colonial origins
substantially weakens our results, it is not clear to us whether former colonies have chosen
a certain type of democracy to imitate the colonizers institutions or because these type of
institutions suited well with their economic fundamentals. Another interpretation is that
British colonies borrowed not only the majoritarian electoral law but also the pro-market
attitude of England. As the latter might induce high inequality, this may explain the corre-
lation between British colonial origins and high inequality observed in the data.51 We have
therefore included in the regression a variable of regulatory quality, taken from Kaufmann
et al. (2005), which measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies.52 We have used
the average value of the rst two years available in the dataset, 1996 and 1998. Given that
many constitutions have been chosen much before the 1990s, we are here assuming that
48Recall that the Gini coe¢ cient employed is measured in a scale from 0 to 100, which means that an
increase of one point in inequality increases the probability of adopting a majoritarian system by 3%.
49The Gini coe¢ cient in column (5) is less precisely estimated but the p-value is 5.2%.
50There are no Spanish-Portuguese colonies in the sample and the inclusion of col_oth alone would not
change the results with respect to the baseline specication. When we control only for col_uk, the Gini
estimate is 0.02 and the p-value 12.4%.
51We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this to our attention.
52In particular, this variable takes into account price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well
as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business
development.
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this variable has not been subject to large time variations. As there could be endogeneity
problems with this specication, we have not included it in Table 3. The results (available
from the authors) are encouraging. The Gini coe¢ cient is now very similar to all other spec-
ications (0.029) and its p-value is 5.6%. The dummy variable for former British colonies is
still statistically signicant while the regulatory quality variable is not. Finally, column (7)
shows that the results are robust when we control for religious fractionalization.
Table 4 reports the results for the same analysis using the whole sample with the clas-
sication based on the electoral rule. While the unconditional correlation between income
inequality and electoral system in this sample is not very high, the correlation becomes
strong when we control for ethnic fragmentation. In fact, in the baseline specication re-
ported in column (1) we nd that the marginal e¤ect evaluated at the mean of an increase
in inequality on the probability of adopting a majoritarian electoral rule is 0.016 and this
is statistically signicant at 5% level. The linguistic fractionalization coe¢ cient has also a
positive statistically signicant e¤ect. The same result is obtained controlling for popula-
tion and income (columns (2) and (3)). The Gini coe¢ cient has the same magnitude but
it is less precisely estimated when we include the three regional dummies. The p-value of
the coe¢ cient is 10.7% however. In columns (5) and (6) we control for religious and for
colonial origins respectively. The estimated Gini coe¢ cient is pretty large (about 0.03) and
signicant at 5% in both specications. Results are also robust when controlling for religious
fractionalization which is positively correlated with plurality rule (see column (7)).
Table 5 shows the results when presidential regimes with PR are classied as majoritarian
systems. The relationship between inequality and majoritarian democracy is very strong.
The marginal e¤ect on the probability of adopting a majoritarian democracy evaluated at
the mean is large, about 0.024, and statistically signicant at 1% level in all specications.53
Finally, we have performed the following three robustness checks whose results are avail-
able from the authors. First, we have estimated the relationship between inequality and
constitution also with probit and linear probability models. This yielded similar results.
Second, we have used three other Gini coe¢ cients: the unadjusted Gini; the Gini adjusted
if the data is based on net income rather than gross (along with the adjustment for in-
come versus expenditure); the Gini coe¢ cient with a further adjustment if the information
is based on households instead than individuals. Using these Gini coe¢ cients yields very
53We have also replicated the same analysis excluding the presidential regimes with PR. The results are
very close to those obtained for the sample of parliamentary democracies reported in Table 3.
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similar estimates in all samples. Third, we have tried to understand if the quality of the Gini
coe¢ cients could play a role in our estimate even though, in principle, the inclusion of lower
quality data should work against our hypothesis. To this purpose, we have rst restricted
the sample to high quality data only and the estimates are similar to those presented above.
A second check was to add a dummy variable for the quality (high or low) of the Gini co-
e¢ cient in each specication. Again, the estimate for income inequality remained basically
unchanged while the estimate of the variable for the quality of the Gini coe¢ cient was always
statistically insignicant. Therefore, we conclude that there is a strong positive relationship
between income inequality and majoritarian democracy as predicted by our model.
8 Conclusions
This paper shares with other recent contributions in political economics the premise that
constitutional principles are of great importance in shaping scal policy outcomes in repre-
sentative democracies. We show that generally consensual democracies have higher taxation
and bigger governments than majoritarian ones. But on top of this we demonstrate that,
once institutions are viewed as endogenous, consensual democracy is more di¢ cult to sus-
tain politically in a more unequal society since greater inequality tends to undermine the
stability of the coalition supporting it. The results of our empirical analysis are consistent
with the theoretical nding that more unequal societies are expected to adopt a majori-
tarian constitution, while relatively equal countries are more likely to choose a consensual
constitution.
The results of our model concerning the e¤ects of inequality on institutional choice, as well
as on scal policy, appear to be not only signicant per se, but for the guidelines they o¤er
for future empirical research on the economic consequences of constitutions. In particular,
they provide a rm theoretical background for the intuitive claim that the assignment of
constitutions across countries is not random, but reects a number of fundamentals, among
which the extent of income inequality is of special importance.
Future events on constitutional choices and new data on income inequality will provide
further information to test our theory. On the one hand, it will be interesting to observe
the constitutions chosen by new countries escaping from dictatorship and moving towards
democracy. On the other hand, it will also be possible to see whether democratic countries
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experiencing a sensible increase or reduction in income inequality will question or change
their current constitutional framework.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We rst prove that only the rich run for o¢ ce and then that the set of citizen-candidates
running for o¢ ce is not empty.
Step 1. Assume that at least one rich candidate runs for o¢ ce. Would anyone else run
for o¢ ce? The answer is no. If a middle class agent also runs, he would be defeated by
the rich candidate because both the rich and the poor would vote for the rich. The poor
nd it convenient to vote for the rich candidate because in their eyes he is the less bad of
the two of them: he o¤ers to the poor none of their preferred public good but demands
lower taxes. Similarly, if a poor agent runs for o¢ ce against a rich candidate, he would be
defeated by the vote of the middle class and the rich. Lastly, notice it cannot be the case that
a candidate from each group runs for o¢ ce. Indeed, the middle class candidate would win
the election with certainty in that instance (recall that mb > max fmp;mrg by assumption),
and therefore neither a poor nor a rich candidate would run against him.
Step 2. We now demonstrate that the set of citizen-candidates running for o¢ ce is not
empty, i.e. that at least one rich candidate runs for o¢ ce. Let p denote the probability of vic-
tory for a rich citizen-candidate (in a symmetric equilibrium, this will be the same across iden-
tical citizen-candidates). A rich agent wants to run for o¢ ce if and only if the expected gain of
running exceeds its cost, namely if fp [wr ( r; Gr) + k] + (1  p)wr ( r; Gr)g wr( ;G) > ",
where ( ;G) denotes the policy vector implemented if he does not run and the term in
the graph parenthesis is the expected utility if he runs, given that only rich candidates do
so. To show that the set of citizen-candidates running for o¢ ce is not empty, it is suf-
cient to demonstrate that this condition is satised when only one rich person runs for
o¢ ce for all ( ;G) 2  [0; 1] R3+. To see this, observe that in this case p = 1 and the
participation constraint of the rich candidate reads wr ( r; Gr) + k   wr( ;G) > ". Since
the policy vector ( r; Gr) maximizes the welfare of the rich, wr ( r; Gr) > wr( ;G), for
all ( ;G) 2  [0; 1] R3+ with ( ;G) 6= ( r; Gr), and given that k > ", the participation
constraint of the rich candidate always holds with strict inequality when p = 1.
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9.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In this Appendix we show that exist a value of , that we call , such that the utility derived
by the middle class from the government coalition with the poor wb
1;b;p
is higher than the
corresponding utility from the coalition with the rich wb
1;b;r
if  < , and that the opposite
is true whenever  > . To this aim, we rst show that wb
1;b;r
is monotonically increasing in
, while wb
1;b;p
is strictly monotonically decreasing in . Then, to prove that there is a single
crossing between these two schedules in the range where  2 (0; 1), we show that wb
1;b;p
is
higher than wb
1;b;r
at  = 0, and that the opposite holds at  = 1.
The utility of the middle class in the government coalition with the rich wb
1;b;r
is dened
by the maximization problem (5) subject to the participation constraint of the rich (4).
Di¤erentiating (5) with respect to  and applying the envelope theorem we get that
(11)
dwb
1;b;r
d
=  Hg(gb1;b;r)
@gr1;b;r
@
> 0:
Indeed, assuming that (4) is binding and applying the implicit function theorem we get
(12)
@gr1;b;r
@
=  

(1   2;r;p) yr +H(gr2;r;p)
  (1   2;p;b) yr
Hg(gr1;b;r)
< 0
given that the numerator is positive because it is the di¤erence between the utility of the rich
when they are agenda setter at round 2 (which is greater than yr) and their utility under the
poor and middle class government coalition (which is lower than yr). In this case dwb
1;b;r
=d
is strictly positive. Instead, if the participation constraint of the rich (4) is not binding, then
wb
1;b;r
is at its global maximum, @gr1;b;r=@ = 0 and dw
b
1;b;r
=d = 0. Hence, the result in (11)
shows that wb
1;b;r
is monotonically increasing in .
The utility of the middle class in the government coalition with the poor wb1;b;p is dened
by the maximization problem (8) subject to the participation constraint of the poor (7). If
we di¤erentiate (8) with respect to  and apply the envelope theorem we obtain that
(13)
dwb1;b;p
d
=  Hg(gb1;b;p)
@gp1;b;p
@
< 0
given that from (7)
(14)
@gp1;b;p
@
=  y
p   (1   2;p;b) yp +H(gp2;p;b)
Hg(g
p
1;b;p)
> 0:
Indeed, the numerator at the right hand side of (14) is negative because it is the di¤erence
between yp and the utility of the poor when they are agenda setter at round 2 (which is
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greater than yp). The result in (13) means that wb
1;b;p
is strictly monotonically decreasing in
.
Then, it remains to show that wb
1;b;p
(0) > wb
1;b;r
(0) and that wb
1;b;p
(1) < wb
1;b;r
(1). We prove
the rst inequality by showing that the participation constraints of the rich and the poor
at  = 0 imply that, for any given level of tax rate chosen by the middle class, the rich
have to be compensated with a greater amount of their preferred public good. Indeed, the
participation constraint of the poor at  = 0 implies that
(15) H(gp1;b;p) =  1;b;py
p
while from the participation constraint of the rich we get54
(16) H(gr1;b;r) =

(1   2;r;p) yr +H(gr2;r;p)
  (1   1;b;r) yr:
The expression in the square brackets in the right hand side of (16) is the utility of the rich
when they are agenda setter at round 2 and it is clearly greater than yr. Hence, it is of
course the case that
(17) H(gr1;b;r) >  1;b;ry
r:
By combining (15) and (17) and taking into account also the fact that yr > yp, one can
easily verify that for any given level of tax rate  1;b;r =  1;b;p =  we have that gr1;b;r > g
p
1;b;p.
This in turn implies that the middle class agenda setter obtains a higher level of utility by
making a coalition with the poor instead than with the rich, i.e. wb
1;b;p
(0) > wb
1;b;r
(0).
At  = 1 the utility of the middle class under the government coalition with the poor
wb
1;b;p
is equal to yb. This result can be obtained by observing that at  = 1 the maximization
problem of the middle class is subject to the participation constraint of the poor where they
are agenda setter with probability one at round 2 and maximize their utility subject to
the constraint of giving to the middle class a level of utility equal to the status quo (which
corresponds to their level of income yb).55
54The participation constraint of the rich is always binding at  = 0 as their expected utility at round 2
is greater than yr.
55Formally, the maximization problem when  = 1 is the following:
max
f1;b;pg
wb
1;b;p
= (1  
1;b;p
)yb +H(1;b;py   gp1;b;p)
s:t: (1  1;b;p) yp +H(gp1;b;p) > maxf2;p;bg (1  2;p;b) y
p +H(2;p;by   gb2;p;b)
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From the maximization problem of the middle class when she forms a government coali-
tion with rich, it is immediate to verify that wb
1;b;r
is always greater than yb at  = 1.
Indeed, from the participation constraint of the rich at  = 1, i.e. (1   1;b;r) yr+H(gr1;b;r) >
(1   2;p;b) yr, we know that the middle class could implement the following policy: 0 <
 1;b;r 6  2;p;b, gr1;b;r = 0, gb1;b;r =  1;b;ry. This policy satises the participation constraint of
the rich and gives to the middle class a higher utility than her income level yb. Given that
the optimal policy gives to the middle class a higher utility than this policy, and therefore
of yb, it is clear that wb
1;b;r
(1) > wb
1;b;p
(1).
9.3 Proof of Result 1
In this Appendix we show that under the assumptions stated in the main text the following
inequalities hold for all :  r <  1;b;r <  1;b;p. To this aim, we rst prove that  r <  1;b;r 6  b
by showing that  1;b;r =  r at  = 0,  1;b;r =  b at  = 1, and that  1;b;r is monotonically
increasing in . Next, we show that  b <  1;b;p.
At  = 0 the rich are agenda setter with probability one at round 2, and they form the
government coalition with the poor. If the income of the poor is equal to zero, the scal
policy implemented at the second round corresponds to the dictatorial policy of the rich as
the poor do not need to be compensated with a positive amount of their preferred public
good. Thus, to form a government coalition at round 1, the middle class has to propose a
policy to the rich such that their level of utility is the same they obtain at round 2. Given
that the latter is equal to its global unconstrained maximum, the middle class can only
implement the dictatorial policy of the rich, that is:  1;b;r =  2;r;p =  r, gr1;b;r = g
r
2;r;p
=  ry
and gb
1;b;r
= 0. In other words, the policy implemented (and the tax rate chosen) by the
government coalition formed by the middle class and the rich at  = 0 (if yp = 0) is the
same as the one in majoritarian democracy.
We have previously shown that  1;b;r =  b for all values of  such that the participation
constraint of the rich is not binding and that this is always the case at  = 1 if yp = 0.
To prove that  1;b;r is monotonically increasing in , we di¤erentiate the rst order con-
dition (6) with respect to  by taking into consideration the fact that from the participation
s:t: wb2;p;b  (1  2;p;b) yb +H(gb2;p;b) = yb
and it is immediate to verify that wb
1;b;p
= wb2;p;b = y
b.
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constraint of the rich (4), gr
1;b;r
= gr
1;b;r
 
; 
1;b;r
()

and @gr
1;b;r
=@
1;b;r
= yr=Hg(g
r
1;b;r
).56 After
some algebra we obtain
@ 1;b;r
@
8><>:Hgg(gb1;b;r)
"
y   y
r
Hg(gr1;b;r)
#2
+Hgg(g
r
1;b;r)
(yr)2Hg(g
b
1;b;r)h
Hg(gr1;b;r)
i3
9>=>;+
(18) +
@gr1;b;r
@
8><>: Hgg(gb1;b;r)
"
y   y
r
Hg(gr1;b;r)
#
+Hgg(g
r
1;b;r)
yrHg(g
b
1;b;r)h
Hg(gr1;b;r)
i2
9>=>; = 0:
which allows us to determine the sign of @ 1;b;r=@. Indeed, notice that the term in graph
parenthesis that multiplies @1;b;r
@
is always negative and from (12) we know that @gr1;b;r=@ <
0. Therefore, the sign of the relationship between  1;b;r and  depends on the sign of the
term in the second graph parenthesis of (18) which multiplies @gr1;b;r=@. In particular,
@ 1;b;r=@ > 0 if and only if
(19)  Hgg(gb1;b;r)
"
y   y
r
Hg(gr1;b;r)
#
+Hgg(g
r
1;b;r)
yrHg(g
b
1;b;r)h
Hg(gr1;b;r)
i2 6 0
and vice versa. Even though in general it is not possible to give a denite sign to the left
hand side of (19), assuming a power function for the utility of the public good it turns out
that inequality (19) is satised if
(20)
A(gr
1;b;r
)

1;b;r
yr
6 1

where the numerator of the left hand side of (20) is the utility that the rich get from their
preferred public good provided and the denominator represents the taxes they pay. It is
useful to rewrite inequality (20) as
(21) A(gr
1;b;r
)   
1;b;r
yr 6 (1  )A(gr
1;b;r
):
By using a power function specication for H() and subtracting yr to both sides, we can
rewrite the participation constraint of the rich (4) as
(22)   1;b;ryr + A(gr1;b;r) = (1  )
  2;r;pyr + A(gr2;r;p)   2;p;byr:
56We remind that 1;b;r =  b when the participation constraint is not binding.
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The substitution of (22) into (21) leads to the following weak inequality
(23) (1  )   2;r;pyr + A(gr2;r;p)   2;p;byr   (1  )A(gr1;b;r) 6 0:
Now, if we take into consideration the fact that the dictatorial policy of the rich is imple-
mented at round 2 under the rich and poor coalition (see the discussion above), we are able
to rewrite (23) as57
(24) (1  ) (1  ) 1 A 11 

y
yr
 
1 
   2;p;byr   (1  )A(gr1;b;r) 6 0:
Notice that only the rst component of the left hand side of (24) is positive and this term
decreases until zero as yr increases.58 Therefore, there exists a yr su¢ ciently high relatively
to y such that (24) is always satised, which in turn means that @ 1;b;r=@ > 0.59
At this point we know that  1;b;r is monotonically increasing in , that  1;b;r (0) =  r and
that  1;b;r (1) =  b and this implies that  r <  1;b;r 6  b.
We now want to prove that  1;b;p is always higher than  b and to this aim we show that
 1;b;p = 
b at  = 0 and that  1;b;p is increasing in . The rst point is easily shown by
observing that the middle class agenda setter in the coalition with the poor can implement
her dictatorial policy at  = 0 if yp = 0 because the participation constraint of the poor (7)
is not binding. To prove the second point we di¤erentiate the rst order condition (9) with
respect to  by taking into account that from the participation constraint of the poor (7),
gp
1;b;p
= gp
1;b;p
 
; 
1;b;p
()

and @gp
1;b;p
=@
1;b;p
= yp=Hg(g
p
1;b;p
). After rearranging terms we get
@ 1;b;p
@
8><>:Hgg(gb1;b;p)
24y   yp
Hg

gp
1;b;p

35+Hgg(gp1;b;p)(yp)2Hg(gb1;b;p)h
Hg

gp
1;b;p
i3
9>=>;+
(25) +
@gp1;b;p
@
8><>: Hgg(gb1;b;p)
24y   yp
Hg

gp
1;b;p

35+Hgg(gp1;b;p) ypHg(gb1;b;p)h
Hg

gp
1;b;p
i2
9>=>; = 0:
57We are using the fact that 2;r;p =  r, gr2;r;p = 
ry with  r =

Ay
yr
 1
1 
.
58The rst component of (23) and (24) represents the net gain (with respect to the status quo) of the rich
in utility terms when they are agenda setter at round 2 multiplied by (1  ). Clearly, this component goes
to zero as  tends to one.
59Using the fact that the dictatorial policy of the rich is implemented at  = 0 and therefore gr
1;b;r
(0) =  ry,
it is immediate to verify that the left hand side of (24) is equal to zero at  = 0. Moreover, notice that the
left hand side of (24) is more likely to be positive when  is small. In this case 1;b;r would be decreasing in
. When yr in not su¢ ciently high, the numerical simulations conrm that 1;b;r is decreasing for values of
 low and then it becomes increasing when  is big enough.
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From (14) we know that @gp1;b;p=@ > 0 and, given that the term in the rst graph parenthesis
is always negative, the sign of @ 1;b;p=@ depends on the sign of the term in the second graph
parenthesis that multiplies @gp1;b;p=@. If
(26)  Hgg(gb1;b;p)
24y   yp
Hg

gp
1;b;p

35+Hgg(gp1;b;p) ypHg(gb1;b;p)h
Hg

gp
1;b;p
i2 > 0
then @ 1;b;p=@ > 0, and vice versa. In this case we dont need to use a power function
specication for H() because using the fact that yp = 0 and gp
1;b;p
> 0 for all  > 0,
inequality (26) becomes  Hgg(gb1;b;p)y > 0, which is always satised given that Hgg() < 0.
This implies that  1;b;p is monotonically increasing in  and its minimum level is equal to  b
at  = 0.
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Fig. 1. Taxation across constitutions and coalitions when 0=py  and ry  is high relative to y . 
 
Fig. 2. Taxation with 9.0=py , 95.0=by , 1=y , 1.1=ry . The schedules with (new) and **φ refer to 
4=ry . 
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Fig. 3. Taxation with 9.0=py , 95.0=by , 1=y , 6.1=ry . The schedules with (new) and **φ  refer to 
5.2=ry . 
 
Fig. 4. Taxation with 3.0=py , 8.0=by , 1=y , 6.1=ry . The schedules with (new) and **φ  refer to 
4.2=ry . 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of income inequality (variable: giniycai). 
 
Sample: PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES 
Electoral system Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Majoritarian  14 43.936 8.933 25.71 57.4 
Proportional 17 34.179 9.132 21.5 51 
Total  31 38.585 10.17 21.5 57.4 
Sample: PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES 
Electoral system Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Majoritarian  9 48.95 12.723 28.53 68.6 
Proportional 17 49.534 9.33 33.64 65.38 
Total  26 49.332 10.373 28.53 68.6 
Sample: WHOLE – classification: based on the electoral system 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Majoritarian  23 45.898 10.596 25.71 68.6 
Consensual 34 41.856 11.974 21.5 65.38 
Total  57 43.487 11.515 21.5 68.6 
Sample: WHOLE – classification: presidential systems with PR enter as majoritarian 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Majoritarian  40 47.443 10.118 25.71 68.6 
Consensual  17 34.179 9.132 21.5 51 
Total  57 43.487 11.515 21.5 68.6 
 
 
Table 2. Income distribution and constitution selection. 
 
Panel A. Income distribution in parliamentary democracies. 
 
 1st quartile 
21.5≤gini≤26.98 
2nd quartile 
30.06≤gini≤40.58 
3rd quartile 
41.71≤gini≤45.49 
4th quartile 
46.02≤gini≤57.4 
Total 
 
Majoritarian  Ukraine Nepal, Bangladesh, 
Malaysia 
India, Bahamas, 
Barbados 
Trinidad&T., Japan, 
Singapore, France, 
Thailand, Jamaica, 
Botswana 
 
Consensual  Slovak R., Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria, 
Czech R., Poland, 
Latvia 
Taiwan, Spain, 
Italy, Germany, 
Portugal 
Greece, Estonia, 
Fiji, Senegal 
Turkey  
      
Majoritarian  1 3 3 7 14 
Consensual  7 5 4 1 17 
Total  8 8 7   8 31   
           
 Below the median Above the median  
    
Majoritarian  4 10 14  
Consensual  12 5 17 
Total  16 15 31 
Panel B. Income distribution in the whole sample. Classification of majoritarian and consensual based on the electoral 
system. 
 
 1st quartile 
21.5≤gini≤35.45 
2nd quartile 
37.11≤gini≤43 
3rd quartile 
45≤gini≤50.11 
4th quartile 
51≤gini≤68.6 
Total 
 
Majoritarian   Ukraine, Belarus, 
Nepal, Bangladesh 
Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Ghana, India 
Bahamas, Barbados, 
Trinidad&T.,Philippines 
Japan, Uganda, 
Singapore, France, 
Zambia 
Thailand, Jamaica, 
Botswana, Chile, 
Zimbabwe, Malawi 
 
 
Consensual  Slovak R., Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria, 
Czech R., Poland, 
Latvia, Taiwan, 
South Korea,Sri Lanka 
Spain, Italy, 
Paraguay, Germany, 
Portugal, Uruguay, 
Greece, Argentina, 
Estonia, Fiji, 
Senegal 
Dominican R,Venezuela 
El Salvador, Bolivia, 
Guatemala 
Turkey, Peru, 
Brazil, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Colombia, 
Honduras, Ecuador 
 
      
Majoritarian  4 4 9 6 23 
Consensual  10 11 5 8 34 
Total  14 15 14 14 57 
           
 Below the median Above the median  
    
Majoritarian  8 15 23 
Consensual  21 13 34 
Total  29 28 57 
 
 
Panel C. Income distribution in the whole sample. Classification: presidential regimes with PR are classified as 
majoritarian democracies. 
 
 1st quartile 
21.5≤gini≤35.45 
2nd quartile 
37.11≤gini≤43 
3rd quartile 
45≤gini≤50.11 
4th quartile 
51≤gini≤68.6 
Total 
 
Majoritarian  Ukraine, Belarus, 
Nepal, South Korea, 
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh 
Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Paraguay, Ghana, 
Uruguay, Argentina, 
India 
Dominican R., Bahamas, 
Barbados, Trinidad&T., 
Venezuela, Philippines, 
Japan, Uganda,  
Singapore, El Salvador, 
France, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Zambia 
Thailand, Jamaica, 
Peru, Brazil, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Botswana, Chile, 
Colombia, Honduras, 
Zimbabwe, Ecuador, 
Malawi 
 
Consensual  Slovak R., Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria, 
Czech R., Poland, 
Latvia, Taiwan 
Spain, Italy, 
Germany, Portugal,  
Greece, Estonia, 
Fiji, Senegal 
 Turkey  
      
Majoritarian  6 7 14 13 40 
Consensual  8 8 0 1 17 
Total  14 15 14 14 57 
           
 Below the median Above the median  
    
Majoritarian  13 27 40 
Consensual  16 1 17 
Total  29 28 57 
 
Table 3. Constitution selection and income inequality in parliamentary democracies. 
 
Sample: Parliamentary democracies – Logit estimates  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. var. maj maj maj maj maj maj maj 
        
giniycai 0.03 0.031 0.03 0.033 0.032 0.02 0.033 
 (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)** (0.016)** (0.016)* (0.015) (0.012)*** 
        
ethnic 0.16 0.469 0.152 0.762 0.339 -0.517 -0.129 
 (0.649) (0.911) (0.637) (0.715) (0.676) (0.818) (0.703) 
        
language 0.233 0.031 0.096 -0.758 -0.2 0.561 0.486 
 (0.504) (0.634) (0.531) (0.759) (0.596) (0.711) (0.506) 
        
        
lpop_60   [0.626]      
        
        
y_60   [0.555]     
        
        
regional dummies    [0.215]    
        
        
prot80, catho80, confu     [0.234]   
        
        
colonial origins      [0.238]  
        
        
religion       [0.173] 
        
        
Observations 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2 0.21 0.21 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.26 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. Logit coefficients are marginal effects on the 
probability of having a majoritarian system evaluated at the mean. The table includes p-values for Chi-square test of joint significance of the control sets. 
Regional dummies include africa and asiae. Regional dummy laam has not been included because all four parliamentary democracies in Latin American are 
majoritarian. Colonial origins include col_uk and col_oth but not col_esp as there are not Spanish-Portuguese colonies in the sample. 
 
 
Table 4. Constitution selection and income inequality in the whole sample (classification based on the electoral rule). 
 
Whole sample – Logit estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. var. maj maj maj maj maj maj maj 
        
giniycai 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.032 0.029 0.023 
 (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.007)** (0.009) (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.009)*** 
        
ethnic -0.755 -0.757 -0.729 -0.617 -0.81 -1.089 -0.782 
 (0.615) (0.615) (0.629) (0.57) (0.511) (0.525)** (0.504) 
        
language 1.344 1.344 1.414 0.843 1.081 1.277 1.403 
 (0.498)*** (0.498)*** (0.499)*** (0.542) (0.402)*** (0.398)*** (0.411)*** 
        
        
lpop_60   [0.980]      
        
        
y_60   [0.665]     
        
        
regional dummies    [0.518]    
        
        
prot80, catho80, confu     [0.027]   
        
        
colonial origins      [0.004]  
        
        
religion       [0.012] 
        
        
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.39 0.43 0.34 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. Logit coefficients are marginal effects on the 
probability of having a majoritarian system evaluated at the mean. The table includes p-values for Chi-square test of joint significance of the control sets. 
Regional dummies include africa, asiae, laam. Colonial origins include col_uk, col_esp, col_oth. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Constitution selection and income inequality when presidential regimes with PR are classified as majoritarian democracies. 
 
Whole sample – Logit estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. var. maj maj maj maj maj maj maj 
        
giniycai 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.022 0.025 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** 
        
ethnic 0.153 0.222 0.125 0.339 0.31 0.06 0.12 
 (0.283) (0.299) (0.267) (0.329) (0.311) (0.283) (0.296) 
        
language 0.162 0.129 0.028 -0.071 0.072 0.054 0.137 
 (0.199) (0.227) (0.222) (0.358) (0.214) (0.229) (0.208) 
        
        
lpop_60   [0.538]      
        
        
y_60   [0.167]     
        
        
regional dummies    [0.297]    
        
        
prot80, catho80, confu     [0.198]   
        
        
colonial origins      [0.401]  
        
        
religion       [0.261] 
        
        
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Pseudo R-squared 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.31 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. Logit coefficients are marginal effects on the 
probability of having a majoritarian system evaluated at the mean. The table includes p-values for Chi-square test of joint significance of the control sets. 
Regional dummies include africa and asiae. Regional dummy laam has not been included because all nineteen countries in Latin American enter as majoritarian. 
Colonial origins include col_uk and col_esp but not col_esp because all fifteen former Spanish-Portuguese colonies in the sample enter as majoritarian 
democracies. 
